One of the
things that struck me about FERC’s October NOPR
was its tone regarding Low impact BES Cyber Systems. This is most evident in the
discussion of electronic access control in Section 31, pp 19-20, which addresses the requirement for Low impact electronic access controls in CIP-003-7. FERC did say
they would approve CIP-003-7 R2 Attachment 1 Section 3.1, which was developed
to comply with FERC’s directive in Order 822
that NERC address what FERC saw as an ambiguity – and, in truth, a loophole –
in the language of CIP-003. However, in this section they went further, and ordered NERC to start developing a new
Low impact electronic access control requirement that goes beyond what is in CIP-003-7.
I will go
into the substance of what FERC said about this topic in the next post in this
series, but I’ll jump the gun a little and point out that FERC told NERC that
they have to develop specific controls for Lows in four areas: Electronic Access
Points, evaluation of access based on need, authentication of users, and
password management. FERC brings these up in the context of electronic access
control, but they have clearly moved beyond anything they’ve ordered before in
the way of electronic access controls for Lows, which has until now has pretty
much meant firewalls (and, in case you wondered, they’re making it almost inevitable
that an inventory of Low impact BES Cyber Systems will be required to comply
with these new requirements. More on that in the next post).
FERC clearly
believes that Low impact BCS constitute a point of vulnerability for the BES,
and they’re moving to strengthen the controls on them. This isn’t because they
think that the physical assets NERC classifies as Low impact are actually much
more impactful than NERC thinks they are. It’s because FERC sees the entire BES
as being in some way connected on a logical level. You may scoff at this by
pointing out that there is no such thing as a continent-wide IP network
connecting any BES assets, let alone all of them. But if you consider serial
communications as in some way hackable, then this idea gains a little more
plausibility (although just a little, in my opinion).
In any case,
this is what FERC believes, and they will be requiring that CIP-003-8 have more
electronic access controls for Lows. But I think there is another likely area
in which FERC will try to strengthen cyber security controls on Lows, and that’s
CIP-013.
For those of
you keeping score at home, CIP-013-1 was approved by NERC and submitted to FERC
at the end of September. My guess is FERC will act on it within six months,
possibly even earlier (I was quite surprised by the speed with which they acted
on CIP-003-7, given that they’ve only had a quorum since August, and there were
a lot of other items on their plate from the 5 or so months they didn’t have a
quorum).
You also
probably know that CIP-013-1 only applies to High and Medium impact BCS
(although the first draft did include Lows, on a reduced scale). In Order
829, which ordered this standard, FERC just said that the standard should
apply to BES Cyber Systems without specifying any impact levels, so the
drafting team wasn’t explicitly disobeying FERC in limiting the scope to Highs
and Mediums.
You may also
know that there is only one FERC Commissioner remaining from the four that
voted on that standard (and that Commissioner, Cheryl LaFleur, dissented from
the vote, although her objection was that FERC wasn’t giving NERC enough time
to develop the new standard – which I totally agreed with at the time), so the
majority of the Commissioners now are newly appointed.
Finally, you
probably also have heard somewhere that there is a new Administration in
Washington, which many people believed would be very skeptical of any new or
extended regulations – and whose appointees to FERC might be expected to oppose
any major extension of the CIP standards, such as ordering NERC to include Lows
in the next version of CIP-013. However, if you thought that, you would do well
to take a look at the language in the NOPR, since FERC seems not only willing
but eager to extend requirements on Lows. In my opinion, they believe Lows
might be the weak underbelly to the whole BES.
This is all
to say that I now think it quite likely that, when they approve CIP-013-1, FERC
will also order NERC to develop a new version that brings Lows into scope in
some way. So if you have responsibility for Low impact BCS, you might circle
2021 on your calendar as the possible date when this new version, probably CIP-003-8,
will come into effect. And if you’re nearing retirement, you might want to aim
for 2020! It’s supposed to be a good year.
The views and opinions expressed here are my own, and do
not reflect those of any 6organization I work with. If you would like to
comment on what you have read here, I would love to hear from you. Please email
me at tom@tomalrich.com.
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