In October
of 2015, I wrote a post
about an RF CIP workshop I had just attended. Of course, Lew Folkerth of RF
spoke at the workshop, and I summarized his presentation this way (I’ve edited
it a little, not because Lew used language unfit for a family blog like this
one, but because I said a few things that don’t make complete sense. Since I’m
allegedly three years wiser at this point, I can now see the problems in what I
wrote):
“Lew pointed out that there are a
number of “implicit requirements” in CIP v5. These are things that the entity
needs to do to be in compliance, which are not specifically identified in the
actual Requirements. Lew gave the example of the implicit requirement to
“(identify) any associated Protected Cyber Assets” (this requirement never
appears at all in CIP v5, but the entity obviously needs to identify PCAs,
since many of the requirements apply to PCAs). RF isn’t just looking for a list
of the PCAs, but wants to know how the entity verified that every Cyber Asset
in the ESP had been identified as either a component of a BVS or a PCA.
“Another example is identification of Electronic
Access Control or Monitoring Systems (EACMS) and Physical Access Control
Systems (PACS). The entity is never explicitly required to identify these, but
they obviously have to do so to be in compliance - and they need to be able to
show that they haven't missed any EACMS or PACS systems when they did their
identifications.
“Of course, you can’t find out about
these implicit requirements by reading the RSAWs, since they only deal with the
explicitly-stated requirements (2018
note: Tom was being fairly careless here, as he too often is. He should have
said something like ‘The RSAWs are constrained not to require anything other
than what is in the strict language of the requirement’). A questioner
asked Lew if RF would publish a list of the implicit requirements. Lew said
he’d look into doing that. I certainly hope he does – it is greatly needed (another 2018 note: Lew would have liked to
publish that list, but ended up not being allowed to because – of course! – the
ERO, meaning NERC and the Regions, isn’t allowed to provide anything that could
be considered an “interpretation” of a NERC requirement. This is a very sorry
situation, and has led to repeated false
starts by NERC in trying to provide guidance on CIP. The CIP people at NERC
would just love to be able to provide CIP guidance, since the need for it has
been great all along and continues unabated. But it simply isn’t allowed by the
NERC Rules of Procedure, and literally every attempt by NERC staff members to
provide guidance on CIP has ended up being withdrawn).”
Lew’s
presentation was the first time I had really thought about the idea of
“implicit requirements”, which is an excellent way to describe a lot of the
ambiguities in the CIP v5 requirements (another might be “unstated assumptions”,
but I like Lew’s term better because it emphasizes the need for the entity to
document how they complied with these implicit requirements – since there is no
way that an entity can properly comply with a CIP requirement itself without first
complying with any implicit requirements it contains). In requirements
developed since v5, this problem hasn’t repeated itself (at least not much).
But since most of the v5 requirements are still in effect, we still have to
deal with the problem.
I had kind
of internalized the idea of implicit requirements and considered it part of the
overall CIP landscape, as much as the non-implicit requirements – so I’ll admit
I haven’t really thought about it much, and I never wrote a full post on the
topic. But, as I mentioned in a post
two weeks ago, I’ve recently been working with several entities that are fairly
new to CIP compliance, and I realized I needed to initiate them into the dark
secrets of implicit requirements – so that they would have a prayer of surviving
in the cold world of NERC CIP audits. Here is how I put it to them (OK, I never
actually said these exact words, but
I consider myself as having said
them. And that’s just as good as saying them, right?):
I have the greatest respect for the CIP
v5 drafting team – after all, they started working in the fall of 2008 and
didn’t finish their work until January of 2013, when they submitted CIP v5 to
FERC (along the way, they’d also developed– and gotten approved - CIP versions 2,
3 and 4, along with a “version” in early
2010 that was too visionary for its time, but ended up mostly being
incorporated into v5. That version was known as CIP-010 and CIP-011, but these standards
had nothing to do with the current CIP-010 and -011).
However, in retrospect, the team did
take some big shortcuts in drafting CIP v5, mainly because they were under huge
pressure to get something approved by the NERC ballot body and out the door to
FERC in 2012. This pressure was due to FERC’s having put the squeeze on them by
rather impulsively approving CIP version 4 in April of 2012 – as discussed in this
post (I regard approving CIP v4 as the worst mistake FERC has made regarding
the NERC CIP standards. I discussed this in three posts in 2013, starting with this
one). The drafting team most likely felt – and perhaps rightly so – that if
they didn’t get v5 approved and on FERC’s desk in 2012, FERC was going to let
CIP v4 come into effect on its 4/1/14 implementation date. And this would be
followed two or three years later by the implementation of CIP v5, meaning NERC
entities would have to go through two huge CIP transitions in 2-3 years. So they
probably had no good option other than to take some shortcuts.
One of the biggest shortcuts the team
took – again, looking back from 2018 - is that they didn’t bother to write
explicit requirements for all of the steps that were needed to comply with some
of the requirements that they drafted (I certainly didn’t think of this at the
time the SDT was developing v5, even though I attended some of the drafting
team meetings and participated in a number of the conversations). The effect of
this is that a single requirement can contain five or more implicit
requirements. You need to comply with all of the implicit requirements in order
to comply with the requirement itself – but you need to figure them out
entirely on your own, since none of the implicit requirements are actually
written down anywhere.
Probably the most egregious example of implicit
requirements can be found by examining CIP-002-5.1a R1. The “operational” parts
of the requirement are R1.1-R1.3, which all mandate that the entity identify
something called BES Cyber Systems. What’s a BES Cyber System? You go to the
NERC definition, which just says it’s a bunch of BES Cyber Assets grouped
together for “reliability purposes”. And what’s a BES Cyber Asset? That’s a
very long definition, but it starts off with the term Cyber Asset. And what’s a
Cyber Asset? Well, it’s a “Programmable electronic device...”, according to the
NERC definition.
And what’s that? The words “electronic
device” certainly have an accepted meaning, but the word “programmable” doesn’t.
This leads to a problem that I discussed in a number of posts in 2014 and 2015,
starting with this
one: that there are a few words that are vital to understanding the CIP
requirements, which have no NERC definition and no generally accepted meaning.
For each of these words, the only solution – which it took me a long time to
understand, although once again Lew Folkerth was ahead of me – is to do your
best and come up with a reasonable definition of your own, then follow that
consistently as you comply with the CIP standards.
So our attempt to comply with R1 and
“identify” BES Cyber Systems has actually led us to three implicit requirements:
R0.1.
Develop a definition of “programmable”.
R0.2.
Identify Cyber Assets.
R0.4.
Identify BES Cyber Assets, among the Cyber Assets identified in R0.1 (you’ll see why I numbered this as I did in
a moment).
So are we finished with the implicit
requirements in R1? No. Let’s look at the first part of the definition of BES
Cyber Asset: “A Cyber Asset that if rendered unavailable, degraded, or misused
would, within 15 minutes of its required operation, misoperation, or
non-operation, adversely impact one or more Facilities, systems, or equipment,
which, if destroyed, degraded, or otherwise rendered unavailable when needed,
would affect the reliable operation of the Bulk Electric System.” Do you
understand exactly what that means, so you’ll have no problem identifying a BES
Cyber Asset if it walks in your door?
You might, but my guess is you’ll end
up doing what a lot of people in the industry did: getting hung up on the phrase
“…impact one or more Facilities, systems, or equipment…”. Doesn’t that strike
you as a little broad? After all, if I go out to a substation and hit a
transformer with a hammer, I will have impacted a BES Facility (the transformer
meets the NERC definition of Facility). Does that make my hammer a BES Cyber
Asset? No it doesn’t, because a BCA has to be a Cyber Asset, meaning it’s
programmable. OK, let’s say I take out my cell phone and lightly tap the
transformer, leaving a very small dent in it. The phone is definitely a
programmable electronic device, and the definition doesn’t say “big impact”,
just “impact”. This makes my cell phone a BCA, right? After all, it impacted
(dented) a BES Facility within 15 minutes. Of course, the drafting team was
thinking of “impact” in the sense of “electrical impact” – but they didn’t
include that in the definition. Hence the ambiguity.
So one big question as people were
trying to figure out CIP v5 was the question of the meaning of “impact the
BES”. They needed this before they could identify BCAs, and they needed to
identify BCAs before they could group them into BCS. How did they answer this
question? Well, I offered my own helpful opinion
on that, but it didn’t exactly gain universal acceptance and shouts of
acclamation (I still like it, and in fact I think it is the “definition” that
most NERC entities have implicitly used in deciding what’s a BCA).
The fact is that, just as in the
question on the meaning of programmable, there is still no answer from NERC on
what “impact the BES” means. Both of these questions are officially on the
plate of the current CIP Modifications drafting team, but that group isn’t
going to directly answer either one of them – I’m 100% sure of that. And I
support them 100% in this particular non-action, since there is simply no way
to develop a real Webster’s-style definition of either term.
On the other hand, the drafting team will neatly deal with both issues, as
part of their proposed changes to deal with virtualization. First, they’re
going to neatly bypass altogether the need to keep using “programmable” by
relegating the term Cyber Asset to a very unimportant role (essentially, the
term will only be used as part of the definition of Transient Cyber Asset. My,
how the great have fallen!). Second, they are retiring the term BES Cyber Asset
altogether, and the new definition of BES Cyber System incorporates language
that avoids the problem the phrase “impact the BES” – in fact, it in some way
follows the “definition” I came up with in 2015, although I’m not in any way
claiming credit for this. Pretty cool, huh?[i]
All of this means there’s another
implicit requirement buried in CIP-002 R1:
R0.3.
Develop a definition of “impact the BES”.
So we have, without breaking a sweat,
come up with four implicit requirement buried in CIP-002 R1 – and we’re still
not done! When we get to CIP-002 Attachment 1 (which of course is part of R1),
there are a whole host of implicit requirements (I honestly guess there could
be as many as 50 or 100, especially when you start looking at some of the
bright-line criteria, which aren’t bright at all but are loaded with unstated
assumptions – i.e. implicit requirements. Maybe I’ll take a month off sometime
and try to enumerate them all, just out of sheer perversity).
CIP-002 R1 is probably the CIP
requirement with the most implicit requirements buried in it. But CIP-005 R1
can certainly give it a run for its money, with maybe CIP-010 R1 easily winning
“show”. I will leave those two as an exercise for the reader.
Let’s get back to reality (I enjoy
doing that every now and then – breaks my routine). What does the fact that
there are so many implicit requirements buried in the “actual” CIP requirements
mean for a NERC entity? The main impact (so to speak) is that your RSAW
compliance narrative for a particular requirement should go through all of the
logical steps that are actually needed to comply with the requirement – if you
do that, you’ll “discover” all of the implicit requirements, even though you
probably won’t recognize them as such. For example, your CIP-002 R1 narrative
could start with a list of the steps we went through above, although probably
in reverse order.
And what will happen to you if you
don’t do this? Will you get a violation? You definitely can’t get a violation,
since implicit requirements aren’t stated in the real requirement. But your
auditor isn’t just looking to nail you for violations, but to see if you really
understood what you were doing when you complied with a requirement. So if you
just say that you “identified” your BES Cyber Systems in your CIP-002 R1
narrative, your auditor might ask “And how did you do that?” If you answer, “I
dunno, I thought this computer had a 15-minute BES impact – and besides, I like
its metallic gray color”, you won’t get a Potential non-Compliance finding, but
your auditor may well give you an Area of Concern, then tell you to think about
how you should identify your BCS and re-do the RSAW narrative to include all
the steps you need to take (implied or not). Then you’ll need to go back to
make sure you actually identified all of your BCS properly.
And if you discover you actually missed
one or two BCS? You would now have to comply for them, of course. But I don’t
see any way you can get a violation for that, since – of course – implicit requirements
aren’t stated in a requirement!
Any opinions expressed in this blog post are strictly mine
and are not necessarily shared by any of the clients of Tom Alrich LLC.
If you would like to comment on what you have read here, I
would love to hear from you. Please email me at tom@tomalrich.com. Please keep in mind that
if you’re a NERC entity, Tom Alrich LLC can help you with NERC CIP issues or
challenges like what is discussed in this post – especially on compliance with
CIP-013; we also work with security product or service vendors that need help
articulating their message to the power industry. To discuss this, you can
email me at the same address.
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